AKBAYAN YOUTH v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, 26 March 2001
BUENA, J.:
FACT:
1.
Petitioners―representing the
youth sector―seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
special registration before the 14 May 2001 General Elections, of new voters
ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to
register on or before the 27 December 2000 deadline set by the respondent
COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.
2.
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the
Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only
is submitted but was then denied by the COMELEC under Resolution No. 3584 on 8
February 2001.
3.
Aggrieved by the denial,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
4.
Section 8 (System of Continuing
Registration of Voters) of R.A. No. 8189 The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996
provides:
The personal
filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the
office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration
shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
ISSUE:
1.
WHETHER OR NOT respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated 8
February 2001.
2.
WHETHER OR NOT the Supreme Court
can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to
conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the
COMELEC’s imposed 27 December 2000 deadline and the 14 May 2001 general
elections.
RULING:
1.
It is well-settled that the law
does not require that the impossible be done. A two-day special registration
for new voters would give rise to time constraints due to additional
pre-election matters. Accordingly, COMELEC acted within the bounds and confines
of the applicable law on the matter. In issuing the assailed Resolution,
respondent simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
2.
The Supreme Court cannot control
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him
the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court. The remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
MAXIM:
1.
Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility.
2.
Impossibilium nulla obligato
est. In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible
thing.
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