Book II
FALSIFICATION
BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OF A PRIVATE, PUBLIC, OR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT: ELEMENTS
·
Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, 26 June 2013.
On different occasions,
accused Tanenggee affixed, forged, or caused to be signed the signature of Tan
as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to
show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the
checks to the loans clerk for encashment. Once said documents were forged and
falsified, Tanenggee released and obtained from the bank
All the elements of the
crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents were established
in this case.
First, Tanenggee is a
private individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in Tanenggee’s
(1) counterfeiting or imitating the victim’s handwriting or signature and
causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2)
causing it to appear that victim has participated in an act or proceeding when
he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in
promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents.
USURPATION
OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS: ELEMENTS
·
Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, 17 April
2013.
As mayor, accused Ruzol
issued permits to transport salvaged forest products to various recipients. An
information for usurpation of authority or official functions was filed against
him on the ground that he was not lawfully entitled to issue said permits, such
authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
The Supreme Court
acquitted Ruzol.Good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation
of official functions. The term “good faith” is ordinarily used to describe
that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. It is actually a
question of intent and although something internal, it can be ascertained by
relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence
of his conduct and outward acts.
In this case, Ruzol should
be acquitted because he acted in good faith. Contrary to the conclusions made
by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol’s act of consulting with the public through an
organizational meeting was not a badge of bad faith. Rather, it was a sign
supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of
salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal
logging.
MALVERSATION
OF PUBLIC FUNDS: PRESUMPTION, MODES OF COMMISSION
·
Cantos v. People, G.R. No. 184908, 3 July 2013.
Accused Cantos was
convicted of the crime of malversation of public funds.
Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) states that the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, isprima
facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal
uses. This presumption, however, may be rebutted upon evidence that can nullify
any likelihood that the accused put the funds or property to personal use.
Cantos failed to overcome
this prima facie evidence of guilt.
He failed to explain the missing funds in his account and to restitute the
amount upon demand. His claim that the money was taken by robbery or theft is
self-serving and has not been supported by evidence. In fact, Cantos even tried to unscrew the
safety vault to make it appear that the money was forcibly taken. Moreover, Cantos’
explanation that there is a possibility that the money was taken by another is
belied by the fact that there was no sign that the steel cabinet was forcibly
opened. Finally, it was only Cantos who had the keys to the steel cabinet.
ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: CONSPIRACY
·
Bacasmas v. People, G.R. Nos. 189343, 189369, and 189553, 10 July
2013.
A Commission of Audit
(COA) report showed that petitioners Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only
signed, certified, and approved the City Government of Cebu’s cash advance
vouchers, but also signed and countersigned the checks despite the
deficiencies, which amounted to violations of R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA
Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002.2.
Petitioners are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Gross and
inexcusable negligence is characterized by a want of even the slightest care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation in which there is a duty to act not
inadvertently, but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons are affected. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due
to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Petitioners were well
aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their signatures on the
cash advance vouchers. Yet, they still chose to disregard the requirements laid
down by the law, rules, and regulations by approving the vouchers despite the incomplete
information therein, the previous unliquidated cash advances, the absence of
payroll to support the cash requested, and the disparity between the requested
cash advances and the total net pay. Worse, they continue to plead their
innocence, allegedly for the reason that it was "common practice" in
their office not to follow the law and rules and regulations to the letter.
ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: SECTION 3(E)
·
Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, 14 August 2013
Petitioner
Sanchez, a city engineer, approved and submitted documents concerning the
improvement of an existing canal to the Cebu City Council. In the course of the
project preparation, however, Sanchez never ordered any of his subordinates to
verify the ownership of the land through which the canal would pass because,
according to him, it appeared to be public land. The
City Council consequently passed a resolution, authorizing the city mayor to
enter into a contract for and on behalf of the city for said canal’s
construction.
A certain
Nadela discovered that a canal was being constructed on her lot without her
consent. Despite the government’s assurances, it never initiated efforts to
remove the canal, promptingNadela to file the instant complaint against
Sanchez.
Sanchez’ conviction was proper.Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with
evident bad faith or manifest partiality or by culpa as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.
There is
“manifest partiality” when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favour one side or person rather than another. “Evident bad
faith” connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some
perverse motive or ill will. Finally, “gross inexcusable negligence” refers to
negligence characterized by want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar
as other persons may be affected.
Sanchez’ failure to
validate the ownership of Nadela’s land on which the canal is to be built
because of his unfounded belief that it is public land constitutes gross and
inexcusable negligence. Sanchez even impliedly admitted that it fell squarely
under his duties to check the ownership of the land with the Register of Deeds.
Yet, he concluded that it was public land solely on his evaluation of its
appearance—that Nadela’s land looked swampy.
·
Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, 4 September 2013; Posadas and Dayco v. People, G.R. Nos. 168951 and 169000, 27
November 2013. (same doctrine as discussed above)
MURDER:
ELEMENTS
·
People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, 23 January 2013.
On the way home,
appellants followed the victim and his companion. The companion saw the
appellants place their arms on the victim’s shoulder, after which they struck
the latter with stones. The victim pleaded appellants to stop, but they did
not. When the victim fell to the ground, one of the appellants smashed his head
with a stone as big as the victim’s head. Afterwards, appellants dragged him
downhill toward a farm.
Appellants claim that the
crime committed is only homicide because of the absence of the circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation, which would have qualified the killing to
murder, and that their respective defenses of denial and alibi were
meritorious.
The Supreme Court upheld
appellants’ conviction. As a qualifying circumstance to the crime of murder,
the essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape,” and
that it may still exist even if the attack is frontal so long as the same is
sudden and unexpected.
It was clear that the
victim, an elder, had no inkling of the impending danger against him. The
attack was sudden notwithstanding the prior act of placing the assailants’ arms
on the shoulder of the victim because such was done in a friendly manner.
·
People v. Zapuiz, G.R. No. 199713, 20 February 2013. (same
doctrine as discussed above)
HOMICIDE:
ELEMENTS
·
Escamilla v. People, G.R. No.
188551, 27 February 2013.
The victim
was about to ride his tricycle when petitioner Escamilla shot the former four
times, hitting him once in the upper portion of his right chest.
Escamilla
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide, which the
Supreme Court upheld on appeal. Intent to kill, as an essential element of
homicide at whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction
of injuries. The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, among others:
1. the means used;
2. the nature, location, and number
of wounds sustained by the victim; and
3. the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.
Escamilla’s intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of
injuries. Using a gun, he shot the victim in the chest. Despite a bloodied
right upper torso, the victim still managed to run towards his house to ask for
help. Nonetheless, Escamilla continued to shoot at him three more times, albeit
unsuccessfully.
The
attending physician, finding that the bullet had no point of exit, did not
attempt to extract it; its extraction would just have caused further damage.
The doctor further said that the victim would have died if the latter were not
brought immediately to the hospital. All these facts belie the absence of Escamilla’s
intent to kill the victim.
RAPE:
ELEMENTS
·
People v. Buado, Jr., G.R. No. 170634, 8 January 2013; People v.
Zafra, G.R. No. 197363, 26 June 2013; People v. Manalili, G.R. No. 191253, 28
August 2013.
Carnal knowledge of a
female simply means a male having bodily connections with a female. The
presence or absence of injury or laceration in the victim’s genitalia is not
decisive of whether rape has been committed. Such injury or laceration is
material only if force or intimidation were an element of the rape charged.
Otherwise, it is merely circumstantial evidence of the commission of the rape.
·
People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, 20 March 2013; People v.
Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, 3 April 2013; People v. Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, 23
January 2013; People v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013; People v. Zafra,
G.R. No. 197363, 26 June 2013; People v. Basallo, G.R. No. 182457, 30 January 2013;
People v. Candellada, G.R. No. 189293, 10 July 2013; People v. Cedenio, G.R.
No. 201103, 25 September 2013; People v. Galagar, Jr., G.R. No. 202842, 9
October 2013.
By the very nature of the
crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant’s testimony because of the fact that, usually,
only the participants can directly testify as to its occurrence. Since normally
only two persons are privy to the commission of rape, the evaluation of the
evidence thereof ultimately revolves around the credibility of the complaining
witness.
The moral character of the
victim is immaterial. Rape may be committed not only against single women, but
also against those who are married, middle-aged, separated, or pregnant. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape.
Physical resistance need
not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the
victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear. It is not the sole test
to determine whether a woman has involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an
accused. It is not an essential element of rape.
Delay in revealing the
commission of a crime, such as rape, does not necessarily render such charge
unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather
than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the
delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.
·
People v. Bacatan, G.R. No. 203315, 18 September 2013
In rape cases, the law
does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because it is
not an element of rape. Hence, the absence of abrasions or contusions in AAA’s
body is inconsequential. Also, not all victims react the same way. Some people
may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while
others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance
while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The failure
of a rape victim to offer tenacious resistance does not make her submission to
accused’s criminal acts voluntary. What is necessary is that the force employed
against her was sufficient to consummate the purpose which he has in mind.
Sufficient force does not
mean great or is of such character that is irresistible; as long as it brings
about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible
are beside the point.
·
People v. Espenilla, G.R. No. 192253, 18 September 2013.
When a rape victim’s
testimony is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling
examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If
such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its
subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
A retraction is looked
upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly unreliable for
there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be
repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or
monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of
credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the
demeanor of the witness on the stand.
·
People v. Caoile, G.R.
No. 203041, 5 June 2013; People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, 30 January 2013.
The law provides that
there are two circumstances for the carnal knowledge of a woman with mental
disability to be considered rape. It may either be rape of a person “deprived
of reason” or rape of a “demented person.”
The term “deprived of
reason” pertains to those suffering from a mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation. Meanwhile, a “demented person” pertains to one having dementia—a
form of mental disorder in which cognitive and intellectual functions of the
mind are prominently affected and where total recovery is not possible.
·
People v. Gaduyon, G.R. No.
181473, 11 November 2013
In rape under paragraph 1 or rape through
sexual intercourse, carnal knowledge is the crucial element which must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. This is also referred to as “organ rape” or
“penile rape” and must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. There must be evidence to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator’s penis touched the labia of
the victim or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.
Rape under paragraph 2 of the
above-quoted article is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The
perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1,
commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. It is also called “instrument or object rape”, also
“gender-free rape”, or the narrower “homosexual rape.”
CONSUMMATED RAPE
·
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 173307, 17 July 2013; People v.
Manalili, G.R. No. 191253, 28 August 2013; People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 190622,
7 October 2013; People v. Guillen, G.R. No.
191756, 25 November 2013.
Slightest penetration of
the labia of the female victim's genitalia consummates the crime of rape. As
the text of the law itself shows, the breaking of the hymen of the victim is
not among the means of consummating rape. All that the law requires is that the
accused had carnal knowledge of a woman under the circumstances described in
the law. By definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman." This understanding of rape
explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the
crime.
In objective terms, carnal
knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape, does not
require full penile penetration of the female. The mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated
stage of rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the
sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim.
This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of the accused capable
of consummating the sexual act touches either labia or the pudendum.
Also, the touching that
constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing
of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of
the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis,
but rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the female
genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia
minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape proceeds from the
physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such
that for the penis to touch either of them is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is required,
however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and
convincingly established.
·
People v. Guillen, G.R. No.
191756, 25 November 2013
Rape may be committed even in places where people
congregate. Thus, it is not impossible or unlikely that rape is perpetrated
inside a room adjacent to a room occupied by other persons, as in this case.
RAPE: WHEN COMMITTED WITH A
DEADLY WEAPON
·
People v. Basallo, G.R. No. 182457, 30 January 2013.
The gravamen of the
offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without
her consent. Relating thereto, when a victim is threatened with bodily injury
as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or bolo, such
constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the
lustful desires of the rapist.
The victim’s failure to
shout for help does not negate rape. Even the victim’s lack of resistance,
especially when intimidated by the offender into submission, does not signify
voluntariness or consent. The law does not impose an obligation on the part of
the victim to exhibit defiance or to present proof of struggle.
·
People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, 20 March 2013.
Rape victims react differently.
Some may offer strong resistance, while others may be too intimidated to offer
any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly suggestive
of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife,
much more poking at her, as in this case, is sufficient to bring her into
submission.
·
People v. Veloso, G.R. No. 188849, 13 February 2013; People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 183091, 19 June 2013.
Due to its intimate
nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses and, more often than not,
the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape
cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial consideration.
It is settled that when
the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or
significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility. The accused then
may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.
Also, the law does not
impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What has to be proved
by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having
sexual intercourse with the victim.
RAPE THROUGH FORCE OR
INTIMIDATION
·
People v. Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, 3 April 2013; People v.
Deligero, G.R. No. 189280, 17 April 2013; People v. Amistoso, G.R. No. 201447,
9 January 2013; People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 200882, 13 June 2013.
In rape committed by close
kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse
of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation.
RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT
·
Pielago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, 13 March 2013.
The gravamen of the crime
of rape by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s
genital or anal orifice. In this case, this element is clearly present when the
minor victim has straightforwardly testified in court that accused Pielago has
inserted his forefinger in her vagina and anus.
STATUTORY RAPE: ELEMENTS
·
People v. Rayon, Sr., G.R. No. 194236, 30 January 2013; People v.
Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013; Caballo v. People, G.R. No. 198732, 10
June 2013; People v. Manalili, G.R. No. 191253, 28 August 2013; People v. Gaduyon, G.R. No. 181473, 11 November 2013.
Sexual abuse under Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements:
1.
The accused commits an act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2.
The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; and
3.
The child is below 18 years old.
Corollarily, the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases define the
following terms:
1.
“Sexual abuse,” which includes the employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in or
assist another person to engage in,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children; and
2.
“Lascivious conduct,” which means the
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus, or mouth, of any person, whether of the same
or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
Notably, previous
jurisprudence has held that a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse
when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence
of an adult.
Unlike rape, therefore,
consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III,
R.A. No. 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected
to sexual abuse constitutes the offense.
QUALIFIED RAPE
·
People v. Rayon, Sr., G.R. No. 194236, 30 January 2013; People v.
Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013; People v. Candellada, G.R. No. 189293,
10 July 2013.
Rape is qualified and the
penalty is death, pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, when the victim is
below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
To justify the imposition
of the death penalty, however, it is required that the special qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the appellant
be properly alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial.
Needless to say, these two circumstances must concur.
·
People v. Hilarion, G.R.
No. 201105, 25 November 2013.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, the
prosecution must prove that
1.
the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
2.
he
accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of
age or was demented.
RAPE: SWEETHEART DEFENSE
·
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 201728, 17 July 2013.
As to the "sweetheart
defense", it is said that love is not a license for lust. "A love
affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to
subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will." In this case,
Cruz’s argument that they are lovers may be true; however, the sexual incidents
between him and AAA have not been proven to be consensual.
·
People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 200508, 4 September 2013
In determining whether the
act was consensual and that no force of any kind and degree was employed, circumstances
as to the age, size and strength of both parties must also be looked into
because force in rape is relative. The sweetheart defense is an affirmative
defense that must be supported by convincing proof.
As correctly ruled by the
CA, such defense is "effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the
victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of proving the
alleged relationship by substantial evidence." Independent proof is
required.
·
People v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 200080, 18 September 2013
For the Court to even
consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be proven by
compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in
support of the theory. Independent proof is required ― such as tokens,
mementos, and photographs. And while Cayanan produced two love letters
allegedly written by AAA, the CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC
that these letters were unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any probative
value.
·
People v. Alcober, G.R. No.
192941, 13 November 2013.
When the accused in a rape case claims, as in the case at
bar, that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was
consensual, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined
to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative
defense, it must be established with convincing evidence, such as by some
documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures
and the like. The sweetheart theory as a defense necessarily admits carnal
knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution
the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape.
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is
not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima faciecase, the burden
of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduceevidence that the
intercourse was consensual.
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION: ELEMENTS
·
People v. Salvador, G.R. No. 201443, 10 April 2013.
Here, the Supreme Court
affirmed the accused’s convictions. Based on the victim’s clear and categorical
testimony, the accused’s overt acts were undoubtedly geared toward unlawfully
depriving the victim of his liberty and extorting ransom in exchange for his
release. That no ransom was actually
paid does not negate the fact of the commission of the crime, it being
sufficient that a demand for it was made.
KIDNAPPING WITH RANSOM: ELEMENTS
·
People v. Niegas, G.R. No.
194582, 27 November 2013
In countering the charge against him,
Niegas contends that the victims’ testimonies do not prove that he has
kidnapped them. He denies all allegations against him and furthers that it is
not him who has demanded or received the ransom money.
Niegas’ defenses cannot be upheld. The
victims’ testimonies proved that the offenders detained them for more than
three days, for the purpose of extorting ransom. Also, the mere circumstance
that Niegas did not personally perform all the acts necessary to consummate the
crime of murder would be irrelevant when conspiracy was proven here since, in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE: ELEMENTS
·
People v. Cachuela, G.R. No. 191752, 10 June 2013.
Homicide is said to have
been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed:
1.
To facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit;
2.
To preserve the possession by the culprit of
the loot;
3.
To prevent discovery of the commission of the
robbery; or
4.
To eliminate witnesses in the commission of the
crime.
In this case, the victim
was killed to facilitate the robbery. The fact that the cartridge bullet shells
found at the firing range where the victim’s lifeless body was discovered
matched with one of the guns found from one of the accused during an entrapment
operation clinches the case against accused insofar as establishing the nexus
between the robbery and the victim’s killing. Also, the gunshot wounds suffered
by the victim also came from the same caliber of gun recovered from said
accused.
THEFT: SIMPLE THEFT AND QUALIFIED
THEFT DISTINGUISHED
·
Almuete v. People, G.R. No. 179611, 12 March 2013.
This case is an offshoot
of an earlier case, convicting petitioner Almuete for violating Section 68 of
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended. A person violating
said section shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, Articles 309
and 310 of the RPC provide:
Art. 309. Penalties.—Any person found guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph,
and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion perpetua, as the case may be.
XXX
Art. 310. Qualified theft.—The crime of
theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen
is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. XXX
Perusal of the records would
show that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) imposed the penalty prescribed in
Article 310, which is two degrees higher than those specified in Article 309.
This is erroneous considering that Article 310 only applies if the theft were
committed under the circumstances provided therein. In this case, however, none
of these circumstances were present. The proper imposable penalty then is that
provided in Article 309.
QUALIFIED THEFT
·
Viray v. People, G.R. No.
205180, 11 November 2013
The crime charged against petitioner
Viray is theft qualified by grave abuse of confidence.
The elements constituting the crime of
simple theft are present here. First, it was proved that the subjects of
the offense were all personal or movable properties, consisting as they were of
jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player and a gaming device. Second,
these properties belong to private complainant Vedua. Third,
circumstantial evidence places petitioner in the scene of the crime during the
day of the incident, as numerous witnesses saw him in Vedua’s house and his
clothes were found inside the house. He was thereafter seen carrying a
heavy-looking sack as he was leaving private complainant’s house. All these
circumstances portray a chain of events that leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioner took the personal properties with intent to gain,
especially considering that, fourth, Vedua had not consented to the
removal and/or taking of these properties.
Notably, however, the very fact that
Viray “forced open” the main door and screen because he was denied access to
Vedua’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by Vedua. Without
ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that were the
subject of the taking, it cannot be said that Vedua had a “firm trust” on Viray
or that she “relied on his discretion” and that the same trust reposed on him
facilitated Viray’s taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction
of qualified theft.
ANTI-FENCING LAW: ELEMENTS
·
Ong v. People, G.R. No. 190475, 10 April 2013.
As to the element of the
crime that the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object, or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft, the words “should know” denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of
his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.
Circumstances normally
exist to forewarn a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may
have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances
include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with
the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold,
and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of
selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and
therefore should caution the buyer.
Accused Ong, who was in
the business of buy and sell of tires for the past 24 years, ought to have
known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Nevertheless, Ong bought the tires subject of this case without even asking for
proof of ownership thereof and allowing the entire transaction—that is, from
the proposal to buy until delivery of the tires, to happen in just one day. His
experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate
ownership of the tires, considering that it was his first to transact with the
seller of the tires and that the seller’s conduct as if he were peddling said
tires on the streets.
Also, while for all
practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a
legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing,
this defense is disputable. Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by
the prosecution in rebutting this presumption.
CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE:
ELEMENTS
·
People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 179041, 1 April 2013.
The Supreme Court
sustained Mallari’s conviction for the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide.To prove this special complex crime, there must be proof not only of
the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
Mallari stole the FX taxi
driven by the victim after he agreed to illegally supply his co-accused with
this type of vehicle. It was correctly found that Mallari killed the victim in
the course of the commission of the carnapping.
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF A
PRIVATE, PUBLIC, OR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT: ELEMENTS
·
Tanenggee, G.R. No.
179448.
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification
has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official, or commercial
document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed.
Actually utilizing that falsified public, official, or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by
the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore,
as a special complex crime, the falsification of the public, official, or
commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.
The elements of estafa are obtaining in this case. By
falsely representing that the victim requested accused Tanenggee to process
purported loans on the latter’s behalf, Tanenggee counterfeited or imitated the
victim’s signature in the cashier’s checks. Thus, Tanenggee succeeded in
withdrawing money from the bank. Clearly, he employed deceit in order to take
hold of the money, and misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use
and benefit, resulting to the damage and prejudice of the bank.
ESTAFA: MODES OF COMMISSION
·
Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, 3 July 2013
Article 315, paragraph
1(b) provides for the liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or
converting to the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property. This is clearly shown by the factual allegations of
the Informations.
Applying these standards
to this case, first, accused Espino
received personal property in the form of checks in trust or on commission,
with the duty to deliver it to another. Even though Espino misrepresented the
existence of a deliverable commission, it is a fact that he was obliged by the
injured party, to deliver the check and account for it. Second, Espino rediscounted the checks to his aunt-in-law. Third, this rediscounting resulted in
the wrongful encashment of the checks by someone who was not the payee and
therefore not lawfully authorized to do so. Finally,
this wrongful encashment prejudiced the injured party, which lost the proceeds
of the check. When accounting was demanded from the accused, he could not
conjure any justifiable excuse.
ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE:
ELEMENTS
·
Jandusay v. People,
G.R. No. 185129, 17 June 2013.
Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the
prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. The failure to
account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation.
In the instant case, it cannot be denied that accused
Jandusay, as CALAPUPATODA treasurer, received and held money for administration
of and in trust for the association. He was thus under an obligation to turn
over the same upon conclusion of his term as treasurer. Instead, he
misappropriated the money to the prejudice of the association and, despite
demand, failed to account for or return them. Such failure to account, upon
demand, of funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.
ESTAFA: ELEMENTS OF SECTION 2(D)
·
People v. Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, 4 September 2013
Accused Wagas placed an
order for 200 bags of rice from complainant Ligaray. Ligaray accepted Wagas’
proposed payment of the order by postdated check, upon the latter’s assurance
of his lending business and money with the bank. Upon Ligaray’s deposit of the
check, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Wagas countered
that it was a certain Canada and not him who had transacted with Ligaray. While
he admitted to receiving a letter from the prosecution regarding his
outstanding liability against Ligaray, he signed it only to accommodate the
pleas of his sister and Canada and to avoid jeopardizing Canada’s application
for overseas employment.
Wagas should be
acquitted here, however. It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of
a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
But, in every criminal
prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the prosecution
did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded
Ligaray by issuing the check.
ESTAFA: TRUST RECEIPTS LAW
·
Hur Tin Yang v. People, G.R. No. 195117, 14 August 2013
The fact that the
entruster bank, Metrobank in this case, knew even before the execution of the
alleged trust receipt agreements that the covered construction materials were never
intended by the entrustee, accused Yang, for resale or for the manufacture of
items to be sold would take the transaction between petitioner and Metrobank
outside the ambit of the Trust Receipts Law.
The subject transactions
in the instant case are not trust receipts transactions. Thus, the consolidated
complaints for Estafa in relation to P.D. No. 115 have no leg to stand on. The
practice of banks of making borrowers sign trust receipts to facilitate
collection of loans and place them under the threats of criminal prosecution
should they be unable to pay it may be unjust and inequitable, if not
reprehensible. Such agreements are contracts of adhesion which borrowers have
no option but to sign lest their loan be disapproved. The resort to this scheme
leaves poor and hapless borrowers at the mercy of banks and is prone to
misinterpretation.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22):
ELEMENTS
·
San Mateo v. People,
G.R. No. 200090, 6 March 2013.
Petitioner San Mateo issued postdated checks in partial
payment of the assorted yarns bought from ITSP International. When Sehwani
deposited one of the checks, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. San
Mateo failed to settle her outstanding account, despite Sehwani’s requests for
payment.
Relating to the second
element of violation of B.P. 22, Section 2 of said law creates the presumption
that the issuer of the check has been aware of the insufficiency of funds when
he has issued a check and the bank dishonors it. This presumption, however,
arises only after it has been proved that the issuer has received a written
notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, has failed
to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.
In this case, there is no
basis in concluding that San Mateo knew of the insufficiency of her funds.
While she may have requested to Sehwani to defer depositing all checks, this
did not amount to an admission that, when she issued the checks, she knew that
she would have no sufficient funds in the drawee bank to pay for them.
BIGAMY: ELEMENTS
·
Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, 3 July 2013
All the elements of the
crime of bigamy were present in this case when the Information was filed on 28
June 2004. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent was contracted on 8 December 1999 during the subsistence of
a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted
on 3 September 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage
for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy.
Capili may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
What makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption that the marriage exists.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS: ELEMENTS
·
People v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013.
Accused Lomaque was
convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness against his stepdaughter for acts
prejudicial to the child’s psychological and emotional development, and which debase,
demean, and degrade her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
The elements of acts of
lasciviousness are:
1.
that the offender commits any acts of
lasciviousness or lewdness;
2.
that it is done under any of the following
circumstances:
a.
By using force or intimidation;
b.
When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; or
c.
When the offended party is under 12 years of
age.
3.
that the offended person is another person of
either sex.
To obtain conviction for
the same, the prosecution is bound to establish the elements of sexual abuse
under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610:
1.
The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2.
The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3.
The child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age.
Lascivious conduct is
defined under Section 2 (H) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 7610 as “a crime committed through the intentional touching, either directly
or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or
buttocks with the intention to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, among others.” In this case, it is
undisputed that appellant committed lascivious conduct when he smelled the
victim’s genital area and inserted his finger inside her vagina to gratify or
arouse his sexual desire. At the time this happened, the victim was barely
eight years old. Without a doubt, all the said elements are obtaining in this
case.
·
People v. Velasco, G.R. No.
190318, 27 November 2013.
The Supreme Court upheld
accused Velasco’s conviction. The victim’s testimony was made in a
straightforward and convincing manner. Her testimony detailed how she was
forced and intimidated by Velasco and how the latter succeeded in molesting her
by kissing and touching her private parts, thus, satisfying the required
elements of the crime charged.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: ILLEGAL SALE
OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
·
People v. Linda, G.R.
No. 200507, 26 June 2013; People v. Lucio, G.R. No. 191391, 19 June 2013; People v.
Resurreccion, G.R. No. 188310, 13 June 2013; People v. Dumalag, G.R. No.
180514, 17 April 2013; People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 191396, 17 April 2013;
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 189843, 20 March 2013; People v. Adrid, G.R. No.
201845, 6 March 2013; People v. Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, 22 February 2013;
People v. Diwa, G.R. No. 194253, 27 February 2013; People v. Tapere, G.R. No.
178065, 20 February 2013; People v. Galido, G.R. No. 192231, 13 February 2013;
People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158, 6 February 2013; People v. Manalao, G.R. No.
187496, 6 February 2013; People v. De Jesus, G.R.
No. 198794, 6 February 2013; People v. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, 9 January 2013; People v. Hong
Yeng E, G.R. No. 181826, 9 January 2013; People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17
July 2013; People v. Blanco, G.R. No. 193661, 14 August 2013; People v.
Salonga, G.R. No. 194948, 2 September 2013; People v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
197550, 25 September 2013; People v. Monceda and Lai,
G.R. No. 176269, 13 November 2013; People v. Spouses Gani, G.R. No. 198398, 27
November 2013; People v. Loks, G.R. No. 203433, 27 November 2013.
The elements necessary to
successfully prosecute an illegal sale of drugs case are:
1.
The identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and
2.
The delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.
It is material in this
crime that the sale has actually taken place. What consummates the buy-bust
transaction is the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in turn, the
seller’s receipt of the marked money. While the parties may have agreed on the
selling price of the shabu and delivery of the payment was intended, these do
not prove consummated sale.
·
People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 191396, 17 April 2013; People v.
Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, 9 January 2013.
When the accused is
charged with the sale of such drugs, the following defenses cannot be set up:
1.
That facilities for the commission of the crime
were intentionally placed in his way;
2.
That the criminal act was done at the
solicitation of the decoy or the poseur-buyer seeking to expose his criminal
act; or
That police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisted in its commission.
·
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417, 3 April 2013; People v.
Lagos, G.R. No. 184658, 6 March 2013.
To secure a conviction of
the accused of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elementsmust
concur:
1.
The transaction or sale took place between the
accused and the poseur buyer; and
2.
The dangerous drugs subject of the transaction
or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
As to the
second element, it is indispensable for plaintiff to establish that the
dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently examined in
the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence. The
identity of the dangerous drug is essential to prove the corpus delicti.
·
People v. Langcua,
G.R. No. 190343, 6 February 2013.
To establish the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the material proof is that the transaction or sale has actually taken place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. The commission of illegal sale merely
consummates the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller.
As long as the police officer went through the operation as
a buyer, whose offer was accepted by the seller, followed by the delivery of
the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated.
·
People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, 6 February 2013.
The crime of illegal sale
of shabu is committed simply when the selling transaction has been consummated,
which happens at the moment the buyer receives drugs from the seller. In short,
what is material is the proof showing that the transaction or sale has actually
taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of the thing sold as
evidence of the corpus delicti.
As in the instant case, if
the police officer would go through the operation as a buyer, the crime is
consummated when the police officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted by
the accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving the
delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer.
·
People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013.
Illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is committed when the sale transaction is consummated, that is, upon
delivery of the illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of the payment by the
seller. While the marked money may be used to prove payment, it is not material
in proving the commission of the crime. What is material is the proof that the
sale transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti, the dangerous drug subject of the sale.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
·
People v. Lucio, G.R.
No. 191391, 19 June 2013; People v. Resurreccion, G.R. No. 188310, 13 June 2013; People v.
Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, 17 April 2013; People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 191396, 17
April 2013; People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 189843, 20 March 2013; Marquez v.
People, G.R. No. 197207, 13 March 2013; People v. Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, 22
February 2013; People v. Diwa, G.R. No. 194253, 27 February 2013; People v.
Galido, G.R. No. 192231, 13 February 2013; Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, 6 February 2013; People v.
Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6 February 2013; People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, 6 February 2013; Valleno v.
People, G.R. No. 192050, 9 January 2013; People v. Hong Yeng E, G.R. No.
181826, 9 January 2013; People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013; People
v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013.
When prosecuting an
illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following elements must be
established:
1.
The accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
2.
Such possession is not authorized by law; and
3.
The accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug.
Possession of dangerous
drugs constitutes prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict him,
unless there is a satisfactory explanation of such possession.
·
People v. Quesido, G.R. No. 189351, 10 April 2013.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be
established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not
authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore
in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will
not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact
that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance
offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT:
TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
·
People v. Laba, G.R. No. 199938, 28 January 2013.
“Transport,” as used under
R.A. No. 9165, means “to carry or convey from one place to another.” The
essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one
place to another.
Appellant Laba was
apprehended in the airport, as he had intended to board a certain flight with a
substantial amount of shabu in his possession. While it may be argued that Laba
has yet to board the aircraft or travel, it cannot be denied that his presence
at the airport at that particular instance is for the purpose of transporting
or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: CHAIN OF
CUSTODY RULE
·
People v. Abdul, G.R. No. 186137, 26 June 2013; People v. Rebotazo,
G.R. No. 192913, 13 June 2013; People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, 6 March 2013;
People v. Sadidia, G.R. No. 191263, 16 October 2013.
The chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
Hence, every link the
chain of custody must not show any possibility of tampering, alteration, or
substitution. But, it is accepted that a perfect chain is not the standard.
Nevertheless, two crucial
links must be complied with:
1.
The seized illegal drug must be marked in the
presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation; and
2.
The turnover of the seized drugs at every
stage—from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station,
conveyance to the chemistry lab, and presentation to the court—must be shown
and substantiated.
·
People v. Quesido, G.R. No. 189351, 10 April 2013; People v. Langcua, G.R. No. 190343, 6 February 2013; People v.
Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6 February 2013; People v. Spouses Oniza, G.R. No.
202709, 3 July 2013; People v. Clara, G.R. No. 195528, 4 July 2013; People v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013.
The prosecution must prove
the following links in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust
operation:
1.
The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
2.
The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
3.
The turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
4.
The turnover and submission of the marked
illegally drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
·
People v. Lucio, G.R.
No. 191391, 19 June 2013; People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, 17 April 2013; People v.
Aguilar, G.R. No. 191396, 17 April 2013; People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417, 3
April 2013; Marquez v. People, G.R. No. 197207, 13 March 2013; Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, 6 February 2013;
People v. Langcua, G.R. No. 190343, 6 February 2013; People v. Manalao, G.R. No.
187496, 6 February 2013, People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013;
People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013; People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 190180, 27 November 2013;
People v. Loks, G.R. No. 203433, 27 November 2013.
Failure to strictly comply
with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not
render an arrest illegal or the items seized from the accused inadmissible in
evidence. What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are preserved, for they will be used in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
·
Rontos v. People, G.R. No. 188024, 5 June 2013.
In illegal drugs cases,
the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of guilt.
The chain of custody rule
under R.A. No. 9165 is intended precisely to ensure the identity and integrity
of the dangerous drugs seized. This provision requires that upon seizure of
illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs
shall:
1.
conduct a physical inventory of the drugs;
2.
take photographs thereof;
3.
in the presence of the person from whom these
items were seized or confiscated and;
4.
a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice and any elected public official; and
5.
who shall all be required to sign the inventory
and be given copies thereof.
·
People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013.
"Marking" is the
placing by the apprehending officer of some distinguishing signs with his/her
initials and signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous
drugs seized upon apprehension are the same dangerous drugs subjected to
inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police
station or at some other practicable venue rather than at the place of arrest.
·
People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, 17 April 2013; People v.
Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013; People v. Ocfemia, G.R. No. 185383, 25
September 2013.
Consistency with the chain
of custody rule requires that the “marking” of the seized items—to truly ensure
that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence—should be done:
1.
in the presence of the apprehended violator;
and
2.
immediately upon confiscation.
To be able to create a
first link in the chain of custody then, what is required is that the marking
be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation.
“Immediate confiscation” has no exact definition. Notably, previous
jurisprudence has held that testimony that includes the marking of the seized
items at the police station and in the presence of the accused is sufficient in
showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office
of the apprehending team.
·
People v. Octavio, G.R. No. 199219, 3 April 2013; People v.
Calumbres, G.R. No. 194382, 10 June 2013.
To be admissible in
evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony
the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the
accused by the arresting officers, turned over to the investigating officer,
forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition, and up to
the time these were offered in evidence.
The integrity of the
evidence is presumed to have been preserved, unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Appellants
bear the burden of showing that the evidence has been tampered or meddled with
in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits
by public officers and the presumption that public officers have properly
discharged their duties.
·
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417, 3 April 2013.
The law on dangerous drugs
pertinently provides for the chain of custody rule. The provisions defining it
obviously demand strict compliance, for only by such strict compliance may be
eliminated the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution of evidence and the
unlawful and malicious prosecution of the weak and unwary that they are
intended to prevent. Such strict compliance is also consistent with the
doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and
liberally in favor of the accused.
The first stage in the
chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items.
Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other
identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon arrest.
The importance of the
prompt marking cannot be denied because succeeding handlers of the dangerous
drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. The marking also
operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from
other materials from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of
at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence. Otherwise stated, the marking
immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related
items is indispensable in preserving their integrity and evidentiary value.
·
People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, 6 March 2013.
Coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) is likewise not an indispensable
requirement. While it is true that Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the
NBI, PNP, and the Bureau of Customs to maintain close coordination with the
PDEA on all drug-related matters, the provision does not make PDEA’s
participation a condition sine qua non
for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust operation is just a form of
an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which the police authorities may
rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of R.A. No. 9165 in support of
the PDEA.
·
People v. Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, 22 February 2013.
In the prosecution of
dangerous drugs offenses, the primary consideration is to ensure that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have been
preserved from the time they have been confiscated from the accused until their
presentation as evidence in court.
Pertinently, a buy-bust
operation resulting from the tip of an anonymous confidential informant,
although an effective means of eliminating illegal drug-related activities, is
susceptible to police abuse. Worse, it is usually used as a means for
extortion. It is for this reason that procedures to counter these abuses are
provided in R.A. No. 9165.
In the instant case, the Supreme
Court found meritorious accused-appellant Secreto’s appeal. With the
requirements of the chain of custody rule not being followed, the prosecution
has the burden to prove that, despite this non-observance, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are nonetheless preserved.
This was not done in this
case. The prosecution failed to show how SPO1 Pamor had ensured the integrity
of the seized items from time they had been entrusted to him at the place of
confiscation until the team had reached the police station, as well as until he
had handed them over to PO2 Lagmay for the marking of the sachets. The
prosecution did not likewise show to whom the confiscated articles were turned
over and how they were preserved after the laboratory examination and until
their final presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Clearly, these lapses raise doubt on the integrity
and identity of the drugs presented as evidence in court.
The prosecution also did
not follow the proper marking of the seized evidence, pursuant to the chain of
custody rule. Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the
marking of the seized items—to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence—should be done:
1.
in the presence of the apprehended violator;
and
2.
immediately upon confiscation.
This step initiates the
process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and
of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on
planting of evidence under Section 29 of R.A. No. 9165 and on allegations of
robbery or theft.
·
People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158, 6 February 2013; People v.
Salonga, G.R. No. 194948, 2 September 2013.
“Chain of custody” means
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals, or plant sources of dangerous drugs, or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure or confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.
Such record of movements
and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court
as evidence, and the final disposition.
This rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
·
People v. Nacua, G.R. No. 200165, 30 January 2013.
Sale or possession of a
dangerous drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of the
prohibited drug. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance
itself constitutes the corpus delicti
of the offense. The fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Of paramount importance in
these cases therefore is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise
established beyond reasonable doubt.
There must be strict compliance
with the prescribed measures to be observed during and after the seizure of
dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and transfer
thereof for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
This is considering the unique characteristic of dangerous and illegal
drugs—that is, they are indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution, either by accident or
otherwise.
Relating thereto, previous
jurisprudence has settled that the marking of seized drugs must be done
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link; thus, it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens
will use the markings as reference.
Failure to do so suffices
to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
and raises reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of the corpus delicti.
·
Valleno v. People, G.R. No. 192050, 9 January 2013; People v.
Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013; People v. Ocfemia, G.R. No. 185383, 25
September 2013; People v. Spouses Gani,
G.R. No. 198398, 27 November 2013.
The failure to submit the
required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph, as well as
the absence of a member of the media or the DOJ, does not make the arrest of
the accused illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence. What is of
utmost importance is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items have been preserved. These characteristics would be utilized in
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
·
People v. Spouses Oniza, G.R. No. 202709, 3 July 2013.
Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165 prescribes certain procedures in keeping custody and disposition of
seized dangerous drugs like the shabu that the police supposedly confiscated
from the accused. Compliance with the law, especially the required physical
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused,
the media, and responsible government functionaries, would be clear evidence
that the police had carried out a legitimate buy-bust operation.
—o0o—
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