MODESTO T. UALAT, complainant,
vs. JUDGE JOSE O. RAMOS, respondent.
QUIRINO SABIO, complainant, vs.
JUDGE JOSE O. RAMOS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Ignorance of the law on the part
of a judge is not only most ignominious, it is also prejudicial to
litigants and the administration of justice as a whole. Magistrates are
well-advised to keep abreast of the latest in legislation and jurisprudence,
and avoid dealing out injustice and reaping embarrassment for themselves.
These are two (2) administrative
cases[i][1] filed by complainants Quirino Sabio and Modesto
Ualat against respondent Judge Jose O. Ramos of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Echague, Isabela, for knowingly rendering (an) unjust judgment, ignorance of
the law and serious misconduct relative to his taking cognizance of an action
docketed as Civil Case No. 827 and entitled Leonardo Coma vs. Quirino Sabio and
Modesto Ualat, which according to complainants is an agrarian dispute and
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The Facts
Complainant Sabio claims that he
is an agricultural lessee of an agricultural land consisting of 4.7 hectares
owned by Leonardo Coma. Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that he
is Sabios caretaker. It appears from the two complaints that on August 6, 1990,
complainant Sabio filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) a complaint for Recovery of Possession[ii][2] against the landowner and Raymundo Sabio, brother
of complainant Sabio. On August 30, 1990, the landowner filed against herein
complainants a case for Illegal Detainer with respondents sala. On July 23,
1990,[iii][3] the DARAB ruled in favor of complainant Sabio
declaring that the right of the complainant as the tenant-tiller to peaceful
possession and cultivation should not be disturbed. On November 5, 1990,
however, respondent Judge rendered a decision[iv][4] in favor of the landowner ordering the
complainants, among others, to vacate the property.
Complainants now contend that,
notwithstanding knowledge of the Department Agrarian Reform (DAR) resolution,
and the fact that Civil Case No. 827 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the DAR, respondent Judge, using his power and authority, took cognizance of
the case because of personal interest and motive. They claim that during the
pendency of the case, respondent Judge, thru his son and brother, cultivated a
portion of the land subject matter of the case.
Complainant Ualat, on the other
hand, alleges that as the result of the unjust decision, his residential house
which is not the subject of the lease was levied upon by the sheriff, and
argued that as mere caretaker, he could not be held jointly and severally
liable to pay the obligations of Quirino Sabio as agricultural tenant.
Respondent Judge submitted his
Comments dated May 2, 1992[v][5] and
March 7, 1992[vi][6] to the aforesaid complaints. In denying the
charges, respondent Judge alleged that he was without knowledge or information
about the complaint with the DAR, nor was he made aware of the DAR resolution
because nothing of this sort was stated by the parties in their pleadings, nor
were these brought out during the proceedings. Thus, on the basis of the
evidence presented, he ruled that the relationship between the landowner and
herein complainants is that of civil lease.
Respondent judge denied that he
had any personal interest in the agricultural land subject matter of the case,
arguing that he did not have a hand in the civil lease contract entered into by
his son and the landowner and that if he had prior knowledge of it, he could
have dissuaded his son from entering into the lease contract to avoid any
suspicions. His brother and his son allegedly entered the land in dispute with
the consent of the owner.
Respondent Judge explained that
complainant Ualat was held jointly and severally liable to pay the rentals in
arrears because he was a co-defendant in the civil lease, and that execution of
the decision had long been implemented but this complaint is being filed only
to harass him because of the contempt proceedings instituted by the landowner
against herein complainants. Complainant Ualat, if he was not satisfied with
the ruling of the respondent, could have timely filed an appeal, but he decided
to appeal only when the judgment had already been executed.
Investigation By Executive Judge
The Court en banc in its
resolution[vii][7] dated August 13, 1992 resolved to refer the case
to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Echague, Isabela, for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Joint Report and
Recommendation[viii][8] dated April 19, 1996, Judge Henedino P. Eduarte
made the following findings, the pertinent portions of which are hereby quoted
as follows, to wit:[ix][9]
1. The complainants claim
that the respondent Judge rendered his decision in the illegal (should be
`unlawful) detainer case inspite of his awareness of the complaint of Quirino
Sabio against Leonardo Coma and Modesto Ualat filed with the DAR and the
latters resolution dated July 23,1990.
The undersigned read carefully
the record of the case particularly the answer of Quirino Sabio and Modesto
Ualat, the position paper of Quirino Sabio, the affidavit of Modesto Ualat and
the affidavit of their witnesses. The undersigned found no allegation in said
pleadings and affidavits about the DAR case. Hence, respondent was not then
aware of the DAR case when he rendered the decision.
2. The complainants claim
that respondent Judge decided the case inspite of the fact that the Court has
no jurisdiction to try the same, as the issues are agrarian in nature.
Jurisdiction is determined by law
and in determining whether a court has jurisdiction over a case, the allegation
of the complaint, not the answer, must be examined.
In this case, there is no
allegation of the complaint that the case is one of agrarian dispute. There is
no allegation that Leonardo Coma instituted defendants Quirino Sabio and
Modesto Ualat as his tenants on the land. What the complainant alleges is that
on December 1, 1988, Leonardo Coma entered into a civil lease contract with
defendant Quirino Sabio whereby for a consideration of P11,178.00,
Leonardo Coma leased his 4.7 hectares of land to Quirino Sabio for one (1)
cropping only which will terminate on April 1, 1989; that this lease contract
was renewed by the parties on May 3, 1989 where the land was again leased for
one (1) cropping season only to terminate on or before September 30, 1989 for a
consideration of 81 cavans of palay; that Leonardo Coma and Quirino Sabio
renewed their lease contract on January 24, 1990 for a period of one (1)
cropping only to terminate on or before March 1990 for a consideration of 71
cavans of palay; that defendant Quirino Sabio violated the lease contract by
subleasing a portion of the land to defendant Modesto Ualat and by his failure
to pay the full rental of the land, that the duration of the lease contract had
already expired.
There is nothing in the lease contract
agreement dated December 1, 1988, May 3, 1989 and January 24, 1990 that it is
the intention of the parties to enter into a contract of tenancy. On the other
hand, it is apparent from the provisions of the lease contracts stipulating
that it is for one (1) cropping only that the parties never agreed to enter
into a tenancy contract
It is in the answer of the
defendants Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat that they alleged that Leonardo Coma
instituted defendant Quirino Sabio as his tenant over the land in 1984; that
Quirino Sabio took possession and cultivation of the land up to 1987 when
Leonardo Coma gave the possession and cultivation of the land to his nephew for
one year and thereafter, defendant Quirino Sabio re-entered and cultivated the
land again; that on the other hand, defendant Modesto Ualat entered and
cultivated a portion of 4,000 square meters and cultivated it believing that it
is not a part of the land in question.
Thus, from all the foregoing
facts, respondent Judge may not be faulted when he said that he had
jurisdiction over the case and then proceeded to decide it on its merits.
However, respondent Judge should have exercised prudence and caution
considering the allegation of tenancy by the defendant Quirino Ualat and his
insistence that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case, by setting the
case for hearing and asking clarificatory questions. This would have elicited
the DAR case and the resolution dated July 23, 1990. Respondent Judge did not
do this. He proceeded to decide the case ordering the ejectment of defendants
Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat.
3. Complainant Modesto Ualat
faults the respondent Judge for ordering him and Quirino Sabio to pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiff Leonardo Coma the current rentals at the rate of
P18,000.00 per cropping season until plaintiff is restored in the
possession of the land leased premises; and to pay attorneys fees in the amount
of P3,000.00'.
The decision of respondent Judge
does not state the reason for ordering Modesto Ualat to pay jointly and
severally with defendant Quirino Sabio P18,000.00 to the plaintiff
Leonardo Coma as rentals of the land until possession is restored to the
plaintiff.
From the record of the case, the
available evidence on this point is the affidavit of Leonardo Coma that Quirino
Sabio sublet a portion of 1.4 hectares of the land to Modesto Ualat.
On the other hand, Quirino Sabio
and Modesto Ualat alleged in their answer that Modesto Ualat entered and
cultivated a portion of 4,000 square meters thinking that it is not part of the
land in question. This is reiterated in the affidavit of Modesto Ualat.
In his testimony, respondent
Judge declared that he ordered Modesto Ualat to pay jointly and severally with
Quirino Sabio the P18,000.00 to the plaintiff Leonardo Coma because they
conspired to deprive the plaintiff of the rentals of his land. This is not
supported by the evidence available from the record of the case and this is not
stated in the decision of respondent Judge.
Obviously, respondent Judge gave
credence to the evidence of plaintiff that Quirino Sabio subleased a portion of
1.4 hectares of the land to Modesto Ualat. However, it is not correct to hold
Modesto Ualat jointly and severally liable to the lessor Leonardo Coma for the
current rentals of the land because a sublessee is only subsidiarily liable for
rentals to the lessor.
Article 1652. The sublessee
is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due from the lessee. However,
the sub-lessee shall not be responsible beyond the amount of rent due from him
in accordance with the terms of the sublease, at the time of the extra-judicial
demand by the lessor. (Civil Code)
4. The claim of complainant
Quirino Sabio that he appealed the decision of respondent Judge to the RTC is
not correct. The record of the case does not show that he appealed said
decision. He admitted later in his testimony that it is only defendant Modesto
Ualat who appealed the decision of respondent Judge.
5. Complainant Modesto Ualat
faults respondent Judge for denying his appeal. The denial however, is correct.
Atty. Marcelo C. Cabalbag, counsel of defendants, received copy of the decision
on November 23, 1990 per Registry Return Card found on page 47 of the record of
the case. He filed his notice of appeal dated January 17, 1991 for defendant
Modesto Ualat which was received by the Court on January 21, 1991. Even if it
is conceded that the notice of appeal was filed on January 17, 1991, it was
clearly filed out of time.
After the denial of his notice of
appeal and the disqualification of his counsel, Modesto Ualat filed his own
notice of appeal on April 27, 1991 which the Court received on January 17, 1991
(sic), it is obvious that the notice of appeal was filed late. Thus, the
respondent Judge is also correct in denying this appeal of defendant Modesto
Ualat.
6. The complainants alleged
that respondent Judge has personal interest and motive on the land in dispute
because thereafter, they discovered that the brother and son of respondent
Judge intruded and cultivated portion of the land.
Respondent Judge, admitted that
his brother Rey Ramos took possession of and cultivated the land because he
entered into a contract of lease with the landowner Leonardo Coma after the
case was decided. After the termination of the lease with Rey Ramos, Leonardo
Coma also entered into a lease contract with respondents son, Joscar Ramos, an
accountant and a part-time farmer who does not live with the respondent Judge.
According to respondent Judge, he had no hand in the contract between his son and
Leonardo Coma as he has his own life to live.
Considering the fact that there
is no evidence that respondent Judge bent the facts and the law in order to
decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, that his brother and son entered
into a contract of lease after the case was already decided and the decision
became final, and that as admitted by the complainants the respondent Judge has
big hectares of land, the conclusion that respondent Judge has interest and
personal motive on the land in dispute is not warranted.
All told, of the several charges
leveled against the respondent Judge, only one which charges him of committing
an error in ordering Modesto Ualat jointly and severally liable with Quirino
Sabio for the payment of the current rentals of the land is substantiated and
found correct. This is, however, a mistake of judgment or law which every judge
commits every now and then inspite of his earnest study of the law and honest
application thereof to the facts of the case. Most probably, since the lease
contract had already expired, the respondent Judge considered the act of
Quirino Sabio in subleasing the portion of the land to Modesto Ualat and the
latters cultivation thereof, as quasi-delict intended, as respondent Judge
declared in his testimony, to deprive the landowner of the rental of his land.
This is, however, inconsistent with his holding that Modesto Ualat is a
sublessee.
In the same report, the
Investigating Judge, among other things, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent judge with a stern warning, however, that he
should be more careful especially in those cases where a defendant claims to be
the tenant of the land in question, and that he should conduct a preliminary
hearing to determine whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Report of
Court Administrator
In a Resolution dated June 25,
1996, this Court referred the aforesaid joint report and recommendation to the
Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a
Memorandum[x][10] addressed to the Chief Justice dated July 19,
1996, the Court Administrator disagreed with Judge Eduartes recommendation to
dismiss the case, reasoning that (t)he mere fact that respondent lacks prior
knowledge or notice of the previous case before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board and its resolution of July 23, 1990 does not entirely
absolved (sic) him of any administrative liability. It should be noted that in
the civil case for Illegal Detainer with Damages pending before him, the
separate affidavits of herein complainants contained allegation of
landlord-tenant relationship and this information could have cautioned
respondent in taking cognizance of the case at once. Prudence dictate (sic)
that the proper thing to do under the circumstances is to refer first the case
to the DAR for certification to determine the existence of the agricultural
tenancy relationship in accordance with existing agrarian laws. His act of
precipitately acting on the case without coursing the latter to the DAR has put
into question his real motive especially so that his personal interest on the
lot is what is concerned in this case.
Additionally, the Court
Administrator cited P.D. 316[xi][11] and P.D.
1038[xii][12] which enjoin a fiscal or judge of any tribunal
from taking cognizance of an ejectment case or any other case designed to
harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice
and/or corn unless the Secretary of Agrarian Reform certifies that the case is
one proper for such tribunal to hear and decide.
To support his recommendations,
the Court Administrator cited the case of Puertollano vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[xiii][13] where
this Court ruled that (i)t is mandatory for the trial court to refer the case
to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative for a
preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties if
it is a case of ejectment or attempt to harass or remove a tenant in
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn. Even without a
motion, the trial court may motu propio order such referral. (Italics
supplied).
The Court Administrator
recommended that a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed
upon respondent Judge with a warning of graver penalty for similar acts in the
future.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Court
Administrator.
The Investigating Judge may have
been technically correct in averring that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.[xiv][14] However,
this is an administrative case where the issue is not whether a motion to
dismiss the complaint could prosper. The issue is whether respondent judge
properly comported himself in the face of the obvious matters brought before
him. As can be readily seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and
Ualat in the civil case, they alleged the existence of an agrarian tenancy
relationship between themselves and the landowner. Additionally, in the
proceedings before respondent judge, complainants were even represented by a lawyer
from the DAR. These matters should have been sufficient to put respondent Judge
on notice that complainants were claiming protection under our agrarian laws.
At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine issue
involving agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject
property. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing
jurisprudence on the subject, together with an ordinary degree of prudence,
would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the DAR for
preliminary determination of the real nature of the parties relationship, as
required by law. At the very least, as suggested by the Investigating Judge,
respondent could have himself conducted a clarificatory hearing to determine
such relationship. The last thing he should have done was to proceed to take
cognizance of the case in the absence of such referral. In the face of these
established facts, he could not hide behind the ostrich-inspired defense of his
jurisdiction being determined by the allegations in the complaint. Indeed, the
complaint was prepared by Leonardo Coma, who found it to his interest to hide
the possible existence of the tenancy relationship, even while he knew of the
earlier complaint filed against him before the DARAB.
In the case of Ocier vs Court
of Appeals,[xv][15] we reiterated the ruling we made in Puertollano
in this wise:
Private respondent, in her
original complaint before the lower court, alleged that petitioner violated the
Land Reform Code and could be ejected under P.D. 816. Petitioner answered that
he was a tenant of private respondent. There was, at that point in time, no
need for referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform as the landowner-tenant
relationship was admitted.
However, when private respondents
amended complaint -- where she alleged violation of a civil law lease agreement
-- was admitted, the issue of actual tenancy -- raised by petitioner in both
his Answer and Amended Answer -- had to be referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform for determination as this was now a genuine issue.
His failure to refer the case to
the DAR upon receipt of the answer of complainants, despite the clear mandate
of the two agrarian laws aforementioned and our ruling in Puertollano,
can in no wise be justified by respondent judge. What is even more embarrassing
is his seeming lack of awareness of the Civil Code provision making a
sub-lessee merely subsidiarily liable for unpaid rentals, to the extent of the
rentals due from him under the sub-lease, at the time of the lessors
extrajudicial demand.
It is a pressing responsibility
of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the
latest decisions of this Court. One cannot seek refuge in having a mere cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one -- certainly not judges. IGNORANTIA
JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.[xvi][16] When the law is elementary, so elementary, not to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[xvii][17]
Finally, we note that respondent
judge had previously been held liable[xviii][18] for gross ignorance of the law and dereliction of
duty, and imposed a reasonable fine of P10,000.00, it being his first
infraction in his 35 years in the government service, 27 of which were in the
judiciary. This case being thus his second infraction, he is meted the maximum
penalty of P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition will be
dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is
hereby FOUND LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law and is hereby imposed
a fine in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Respondent is further ADMONISHED
that commission of the same or similar act in in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
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